University of Chicago Legal Forum
Volume 1987 | Issue 1

Article 10

Two Brief Responses to Professor Epstein
Frederick A. O. Schwarz Jr.
Frederick.Schwarz@chicagounbound.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf
Recommended Citation
Schwarz, Frederick A. O. Jr. () "Two Brief Responses to Professor Epstein," University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 1987: Iss. 1, Article
10.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol1987/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Chicago Legal Forum
by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Two Brief Responses to Professor Epstein
One of my favorite moments in the American musical theater
is the scene in Guys and Dolls when Sky Masterson and Big Julie
are shooting craps. Sky is winning and Big Julie produces a new
pair of dice. Sky protests that Big Julie's new dice are blank. Big
Julie smiles and reassures Sky that he remembers where the numbers are.
I've never heard Richard Epstein sing, but based on his critique of the Wilder settlement, he'd make a terrific Big Julie. He
fills in the numbers on his dice as he goes along.
In deciding that the Wilder settlement was inappropriate,
Professor Epstein argues that aggregate utility was diminished by
the settlement because the white, in-religion children suffered a
greater loss in utility than the black, out-of-religion children
gained. There are two glaring holes in the Epstein critique. First,
he arbitrarily assigns numerical values to the utility loss and gain
experienced by the various players in the Wilder scenario, without
explaining where the numbers come from. One could, of course,
posit a set of numbers that valued the gain by out-of-religion children at a much higher level than the loss by in-religion children. I
do not insist that those numbers would necessarily be correct, but
they would have as much claim to validity as Professor Epstein's
ex cathedra attempts to quantify gain and loss.
Second, and even more importantly, there is no room in Professor Epstein's cosmology for the constitutional values of equality
before the law, free exercise of religion and separation of church
and state that the settlement preserves. Professor Epstein simply
refuses to acknowledge the cost to society of a tax-supported foster
care system that openly favors white children over black children
and Catholic and Jewish children over Protestants, Hindus or the
children of atheists. The flaw that runs through much of Professor
Epstein's work, like the San Andreas fault, is his inability or refusal to face the fact that the significance of constitutional values
is often non-quantifiable and, thus, beyond the realm of economic
measurement. It is, of course, a valuable exercise to describe with
precision the efficiency consequences of a given set of value
choices. It is, however, insupportable to argue that efficiency consequences are absolute trumps, rendering any inefficiency in the
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name of deeply felt values improper. In fact, even at the level of
efficiency, vigorous protection of constitutional values would be
justified, if only Professsor Epstein would factor in the true cost to
society of tax-supported racial and religious discrimination. Even if
I'm wrong, though, and attempts to enforce values of equality and
religious freedom on behalf of the weak lead to economically inefficient outcomes, they would still be worth it. Bread is important;
but so are roses.
Burt Neuborne
*

*

*

As Professor Neuborne and I make clear, the dialogue between
us presented here never took place. It is fiction-designed to raise
broad general issues for practitioners, professors and students to
ponder. Professor Epstein takes, it seems to me, the opposite tack.
His critique purports, through its numerical analysis, to represent
the real world. But the premises underlying that profferred real
world turn out to be based upon a wholly fictional-indeed
false-view of the American legal system and legal profession.1
My principal purpose in responding is to set out some
thoughts on the responsibilities of a lawyer in the real world-and
particularly the responsibilities of a government lawyer. But first, I
would like to offer a few comments on Professor Epstein's views of
the legal merits of the Wilder settlement.
THOUGHTS ON THE MERITS

At times, Professor Epstein actually seems to be writing a
brief in favor of settlement. Thus, he characterizes the plaintiff's
Establishment Clause claim-which sought to bar the use of government money to support sectarian agencies carrying out a basic
government responsibility-as "surely ... plausible." He then cites
recent Supreme Court cases (Aguilar and Grand Rapids) as lending substantial support to the plaintiffs. Of course, if one starts
with the premise that a "plausible" or likely result of a trial could
very well be prohibition of any use of the sectarian agencies, it
seems sensible to a practitioner to negotiate a settlement that permits the continued use of the sectarian agencies. This is particularly true if one believes, as Professor Epstein does, that they pro' In saying this, let me make clear my respect for Professor Epstein for not being shy
in advocating unpopular ideas that cut against the grain of conventional wisdom on matters
such as the value of antidiscrimination laws.
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vide a service that is useful to children.
When it comes to the equal access portion of the case, Professor Epstein constructs a numerical world upon which he builds
with logic which has some force-until one realizes this world is
neither real nor liveable by American standards.
The crucial flaw is that no weight is given to the value of
equality itself, or to the harm done by inequality sanctioned and
supported by the government. Perhaps it is difficult to attach
numbers to constitutional values, but surely they ought to be part
of the balance.
The case for the equal access portions of the Wilder settlement is rather simple. Where government has legal custody of children and is paying for their care, how can it justify a system that
makes access to care depend upon their race or religion? Even
under a "market" analysis that attempts to assign numbers to social values, I would have thought that this country's commitment
to equality of opportunity, and its prohibition against government
systems that deny equal access, would produce positive numbers in
favor of the Wilder settlement. Absent such weights, Professor
Epstein's critique of Wilder could just as well serve as an attack
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.
THOUGHTS ON THE ROLE OF LAWYERS

To me, Professor Epstein raises much more interesting issues
when he indirectly challenges the propriety of a government lawyer
entering into a decreee like Wilder. Here also, however, he does
not confront the world as it is-and I submit should be-seen by a
practitioner.
Professor Epstein simply assumes away both courts and clients. Because there are courts, government lawyers (as is true for
other lawyers) must assess the risks inherent in insisting upon going to trial. If, by negotiation, the lawyer can reach a result that he
or she reasonably believes is better than the result reasonably
likely to follow a trial, then it is certainly not inappropriate to do
so. Indeed, it would be professionally inappropriate to eschew such
an opportunity because-as I sense is the case with Professor Epstein-one believes the result likely to be adopted by the courts is
in some way inefficient, or could be characterized as such.
Does this mean a lawyer can simply go ahead and negotiate
anything that strikes his or her fancy? Of course not. The ultimate
judgment remains with the clients, after a complete explanation
from the lawyer.
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The same could be said about the responsibilities of lawyers in
general. Are there any different factors where government lawyers
are involved? Not really as to the basics. You still have a client.
You still must try fairly to present to the client the risks of litigation and the terms of the proposed settlement.
I do believe, however, that the government lawyer has a special responsibility to force herself or himself and her or his clients
to focus upon the long-term values represented by our Constitution.2 In addition, government lawyers in particular should guard
against the pernicious attitude that "it's wrong, but let the courts
take the heat for changing it."
As for whether a government lawyer should allow a decree to
bind a successor administration, it is difficult to generalize. Obviously, if one goes to trial and loses, a court will impose a remedy of
whatever duration it concludes is appropriate under the circumstances. In the context of negotiation, it follows that there can be
no bright-line test for an appropriate time limit to a consent decree's remedial provisions. Certainly it would not be proper to negotiate with the purpose of binding a future administration. This
would suggest no legal basis for settling in the first place. In addition, a government's negotiating objective probably should be to
agree upon the earliest possible termination date.3 This is not because one is agreeing to do undesirable things, for one would not
agree to any obligations that were improper in principle. Rather,
governments should seek to act consistently with the law on their
own and not under the direct, continuing supervision of the courts.
If it is fairly clear that governments should be allowed to settle
cases by consent decree, does the potential impact of a decree upon
third parties mean that governments should be forced to try cases
when they believe a bad result is likely at trial and a fair result can
be reached through negotiation? To state the question is to answer
it.
This does not mean, of course, that the government or the
court should ignore the interests of third parties. In negotiating the
Wilder decree, the City insisted that all the agencies be given an
opportunity to challenge the decree or any of its provisions. The
City also asked the court to consider any such objections on the
merits without drawing any inference from the stipulations of the
2

For my thoughts on this and related matters, see Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., Law-

yers for Government Face Unique Problems, N.Y.L.J. 25 (May 1, 1984).
1 See paragraphs 79-81 of the Wilder decree (on file with the University of Chicago
Legal Forum). Complex as they are, they reflect a vigorous negotiation.
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decree's signatories.4 In fact, the agencies participated extensively
in the hearings on the decree, and persuaded its signatories and
the court to change numerous provisions in the draft decree.' It is
also worth noting that, as "interested parties," they have extensive
rights under the final decree. All of the agencies were parties in
Wilder, but liberal intervention rights surely should be granted to
third parties who fear their rights are adversely affected by the
decree.
Nevertheless, insisting upon due consideration of the rights
and interests of third parties does not mean that a government client must turn a deaf ear to its lawyer's warnings of litigation risks;
nor does it mean that a government lawyer should fail to try and
avoid those risks by agreeing to a fair, negotiated settlement that
can be presented to a court for its scrutiny.
Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.

4 Id. at paragraphs 82-83.
1 Judge Ward's lengthy opinion, which meticulously analyzes all agency objections,
provides a more complete account of the settlement negotiation and approval process. See
Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1303-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

